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People with dementia have been assumed to possess weak or even no agency, so
this paper provides a novel contribution to academic debate by examining their
actual potential for agency. The author draws on ﬁndings from a qualitative
study of everyday decision-making by people with dementia that aimed to iden-
tify the role of social factors (such as gender) in inﬂuencing their involvement in
decisions. Whilst decision-making constitutes a form of deliberative agency, the
research also identiﬁed when agency was alternatively habituated, embodied or
emotional. The Economic and Social Research Council-funded research was
undertaken in the North of England. Existing theoretical perspectives on agency
are critiqued, particularly in relation to rationality, language and individualised
agency. The study highlighted that people with dementia who lack deliberative
capacity can nonetheless demonstrate creative capacity for agency. A more
expansive concept of agency is needed in social science theory that is informed
by the experiences of cognitively disabled people.
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Points of interest
 Current social science theory on agency is poorly informed by empirical
research, particularly relating to the experiences of cognitively disabled
people – this paper addresses that gap.
 People with dementia have been assumed to lack agency; that is, the ability to
initiate social action or at least inﬂuence their own personal circumstances.
 This paper identiﬁes that people with more advanced dementia who lack
decision-making capacity can nonetheless exercise agency, often in quite
creative ways.
Introduction
Ill-health, disability and agency
Whereas medical sociology has traditionally neglected the inﬂuence of social struc-
ture on health (Williams 2001, 2003), the social model of disability was instrumental
in identifying how disability is systematically produced through the social and politi-
cal processes that discriminate against disabled people (Oliver 1996). More
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speciﬁcally, the model has shown how individual and collective action can be used
to initiate social, legal and political change (Evans 1996; Shakespeare and Watson
1997; Shah and Priestley 2011). Notably, the social model has also demonstrated
when people can act to inﬂuence their own personal circumstances; that is, exercise
agency (see Giddens 1991; Madhok, Phillips, and Wilson 2013). Accordingly,
Williams (2003) identiﬁed the need for research to explore how both structure and
agency inﬂuence health and illness within everyday life.
However, agency theory has been criticised for its concentration on rationality,
language, intentional action and goal orientation (for example, Shilling 1999;
Velleman 2000; Hemmings and Treacher Kabesh 2013). Since people with dementia
may lack these abilities, they are therefore assumed to possess weak or even no
agency. Yet empirical studies suggest that they can exercise agency, albeit in some-
what different forms than highlighted in current theory. However, an over-emphasis
on rationality in agency theory excludes people with dementia who have erroneously
been assumed to lack decision-making capacity, but also excludes those who do lack
capacity but can nonetheless exercise agency (see Brock 1993). In addition, the rela-
tive neglect of emotion has led to a ‘divided’ concept of the self, whereby reason
and emotion are viewed as superior and inferior selves (Burkitt 2008). This divided
view of the self has inﬂuenced the biomedical model of dementia whereby the
extant cognitive abilities of people with dementia are under-recognised and their
emotions and behaviour are often viewed as symptomatic of the illness (see Finkel
2000). On the contrary, such behaviour and emotion may be indicative of agency,
particularly in response to the structural constraints imposed by institutionalised
care regimes, low societal expectations and a lack of opportunities for social
participation.
As agency theory also privileges language (Madhok 2013), this makes it difﬁcult
to apply the concept to people with dementia who frequently have impaired speech.
In addition, a bias towards intentional action has led to the neglect of habituated or
embodied agency (Velleman 2000; Cleaver 2007). Fundamentally, the concept of
agency is over-individualistic, such that relationality and interdependency are under-
recognised (Hemmings and Treacher Kabesh 2013). Whilst the apparent threshold
for agency is unachievable by many people with dementia, there is a need to identify
whether they can nonetheless exercise agency.
Purposeful action and emotion
The capacity for agency in people with dementia has received little attention in the
literature, partly because the dominance of psychological research has led to a focus
on the negative impact of dementia on self-identity (see Robinson, Clare, and Evans
2005; Caddell and Clare 2010). Yet Kitwood and Bredin (1992) highlighted that
both self-identity and agency are central to well-being in dementia. Since agency
requires self-reﬂection (Burkitt 2008), and it was assumed that people with dementia
lacked this ability (Kontos 2004), their capacity for agency has also been unrecogn-
ised. Although agency is the means by which the subjective self becomes a social
self (Burkitt 2008), previous research has not systematically explored or theorised
whether people with dementia can manifest a social self.
Whilst the potential for agency in people with early-stage dementia has also not
been clearly theorised in the literature, research has highlighted how self-help groups
can promote their empowerment (Clare, Rowlands, and Quin 2008; Orulv 2012). In
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addition, a few studies have pointed to the potential for agency in people with
advanced dementia. A study in the United States of conversations with a nurse
showed that they demonstrated assertion of will – for example, a participant’s com-
ment indicated when he wanted to end an interview (Mayhew et al. 2001). Research
in Sweden found that using background music led to increased ‘co-operation’ in
care routines from residents with severe dementia who were ordinarily resistant
(Gotell, Brown, and Ekman 2002). Whereas the same authors suggested that playing
music during personal care led to a reduction in the instructions by staff and an
increase in residents’ participation, this suggested that the residents’ apparent ‘resis-
tance’ was indicative of their expressions of agency, rather than a lack of self-care
ability. Their ﬁndings indicated that constraints on agency can prompt emotional
and behavioural responses (e.g. aggression) in people with dementia (see also
Ragneskog et al. 1998).
This paper will therefore examine the potential for at least basic agency in peo-
ple with dementia. I draw on ﬁndings from a study of everyday decision-making by
people with dementia living at home that aimed to identify the role of social factors
in inﬂuencing their involvement in decisions. Whilst decision-making constitutes a
form of deliberative agency, the research also identiﬁed when agency was alterna-
tively habituated, embodied or emotional.
Methods
An intensive and facilitative qualitative methodology (for example, Denzin 1970)
was used to examine decision-making in action and to enable people with dementia
to use their extant decisional and communication abilities. The overall study identi-
ﬁed whether people with dementia were given opportunities to make decisions when
they retained capacity – either minor decisions such as what to wear or eat or major
decisions such as moving house. However, the current paper explores whether people
with more advanced dementia who experienced challenges with deliberation,
communication and independent action could nonetheless manifest agency. Thus, the
paper focuses on a subgroup of ﬁve people who usually had signiﬁcantly impaired
speech and lacked the capacity to make minor and more major decisions, including
the capacity to consent to taking part in the research (as deﬁned by the Mental
Capacity Act [2005] in England and Wales). Nonetheless, the research explored
when they retained capacity or subtle abilities in discrete areas; for example, when
they could identify their food preferences even if they could not decide what to eat.
The research was undertaken in a local authority area in the north of England.
Ethical approval was obtained from the national Social Care Research Ethics
Committee. Ethnographic and creative methods were used, including participant
observation and interviews. The ﬁeldwork was undertaken over at least four home
visits and each couple was observed going about their usual daily routines, in order
to observe decision-making directly (to some extent). Prior attendance at Wellbeing
Cafes or day centres was helpful in making the researchers familiar to the people
with dementia and gaining their trust (see McKillop and Wilkinson 2004; Miesen
and Jones 2004).
A person-centred approach was used to informally assess the capacity of people
with dementia to decide to take part in the study (Mayo and Wallhagen 2009). The
severity of dementia was also informally assessed – for example, based on abilities
to undertake activities of daily living – except where more deﬁnitive information
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was provided by a spouse (e.g. obtained via a memory assessment clinic). Although
the study aimed to undertake individual interviews with each partner, the research
process was adapted to the cognitive and communication skills of people with
dementia. Brief, unstructured and conversational-type interviews were used with
four of the ﬁve people in the subgroup who lacked capacity to consent to the
research. As an open-ended approach was too challenging, these interviews instead
incorporated closed questions or topics on key themes (such as their likes and dis-
likes), in order to explore their agreement or disagreement (see Acton et al. 2007).
Photographs of the couples (including social activities undertaken during observa-
tions) were used as visual and memory aids throughout the ﬁeldwork to prompt recall
and elicit conversation (for example, Harper 2002). Where they had speech difﬁcul-
ties, their non-verbal communication – such as facial expressions or gestures – was
observed (see Mayhew et al. 2001). An ‘interaction’ method was employed to facili-
tate one woman’s communication and engagement when it was not possible to inter-
view her (see also Grove et al. 1999). More speciﬁcally, the author spent time with
her on a one-to-one basis; used sensory aids to stimulate her interaction; listened
attentively to her speech; and observed her non-verbal expressions.
Recruitment
The couples were recruited via Wellbeing Cafes, support groups and day centres run
by voluntary and statutory organisations. Theoretical sampling (Mason 1996) was
used to recruit women and men with dementia with diverse cognitive and communi-
cation abilities. The couples were eligible to participate if they were co-resident; one
spouse had been diagnosed with dementia and both spouses were willing to take
part. Couples were excluded where the partner had only recently been diagnosed, to
allow time for adjustment. Where the people with dementia did not have the capacity
to consent, their spouses were consulted as to whether they would have wanted to
participate and if they were happy for them to take part (as per the Mental Capacity
Act). The researchers were mindful of when it may have been inappropriate for a
spouse to act as consultee (e.g. if it was not in the best interests of the person with
dementia). Throughout the ﬁeldwork, the researchers were sensitive to any indicators
of discomfort or undue anxiety from the people with dementia. The ﬁeldwork was
undertaken between June 2010 and May 2011. The interviews were digitally
recorded and transcribed verbatim; ﬁeldwork notes were recorded throughout.
Data analysis
A thematic approach was adopted to data analysis (Ryan and Russell Bernard 2003).
The key themes were identiﬁed in each couple’s data in order to explore the couple’s
perspective, but also to enable the views, experiences or feelings of the people with
dementia to be discerned. Accordingly, an interpretative approach was useful in dis-
cerning the meanings of people with dementia (see Grove et al. 1999). The analysis
was also informed by key concepts from agency theory, such as intentional action
and reﬂexivity. The data from each person with dementia (interview, observation
and non-verbal) were examined in an integrated way (see O’Cathain 2010). The
observations focused on the dynamics of couples’ decision-making processes,
whether people with dementia had the capacity to exercise deliberative agency and
variations in their demonstrations of agency (such as when it was habituated rather
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than clearly negotiated and articulated). Where the people with dementia lacked
deliberative capacity, the observations explored their embodied, emotional and habit-
uated expressions of agency (e.g. via body language, routines or rituals). As well as
textual analysis, the audio-recordings were carefully listened to for evidence of
speech patterns, tone of voice and utterances that might indicate agency.
The carer-spouses’ perceptions of their partners’ decision-making abilities and
their rationales for including or excluding them from decision-making were exam-
ined. The levels and types of support given by the carer-spouses and its effects on
the decisional capacity and agency of people with dementia were considered. The
analysis primarily focused on the subgroup with more advanced dementia; other-
wise, where the discussion relates to the full sample, reference is made to the ‘over-
all study’. Whilst the subgroup was quite small, this allowed for their creative
agency to be explored in-depth. The subsequent analysis sought to achieve theoreti-
cal saturation in relation to the key concepts of agency.
The various sources (such as observations or interviews) and types of evidence
(speech and non-verbal data) were corroborated in order to verify the accuracy of
interpretations. Whilst clearly ‘knowing’ the meanings of people with dementia can
be a challenge, particularly when they have limited speech (see Nystrom and
Lauritzen 2005), developing a more intimate knowledge of them over multiple vis-
its, clarifying their views and feelings, contextualising their expressions and explor-
ing congruence between their verbal and non-verbal communication facilitated more
informed interpretations.
Sample characteristics
Twenty-one married couples took part in the study, including 12 women and nine
men with dementia (mainly older than 65 years). The subgroup with more advanced
dementia consisted of four women and one man, each of whom appeared to have
moderate or moderate-to-severe dementia. Four people in the subgroup had signiﬁ-
cant speech impairment and one woman also had very limited ability for social inter-
action. As regards their abilities to undertake activities of daily living, four people
needed help with personal care and even eating.
Revealing agency?
Doing or being?
The idealistic conception of agency as a deliberative process involving clear and
intentional action is rarely achieved in practice (McDowell 1979; Reader 2007).
Similarly, people with dementia can ﬁnd it challenging to plan and undertake every-
day tasks (for example, Cooper and Greene 2005). Accordingly, spouse-carers in the
study often felt that their partners with dementia had lost their motivation. For exam-
ple, Claire1 said her husband, Gavin (who had dementia), had previously been a
decisive man, but now when she asked his views (such as what to do for the day),
he often responded ‘I don’t know’. However, whilst people with dementia lacked
decisional capacity at times, other aspects of their daily lives showed that they could
nonetheless view situations intersubjectively, engage relationally and subtly exercise
inﬂuence within their relationships.
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For example, Trevor said his wife Mary (who had dementia) had always been a
smartly-dressed woman, although she needed help with personal care now. He said:
‘over the years you see and she made all her own dresses …’. Although Mary
acknowledged that her husband helped her with dressing – ‘yes, he does, yeah’ –
she retained pride in her appearance: ‘I like to be nice’. The continued importance
she attached to her sense of femininity, particularly within the context of her marital
relationship, was highlighted when she said she sought her husband’s views on how
she looked: ‘For his … do … do I look nice?’. Irrespective of her cognitive impair-
ment, she was able to use humour habituated within her marital relationship to exert
some inﬂuence over the research scenario, while at the same time exhibiting empa-
thy with the researcher. More speciﬁcally, the couple shared a lot of banter during
the observation visit, including jokes about ‘beating’ each other. However, because
Mary said this while presenting a deadpan face, it was not always clear to the
research assistant whether this was simply jesting. However, as Mary made a point
of reassuring her – ‘we’re only joking you know’ – this signiﬁed her observance of
her visitor’s disquiet and the abilities to imagine and empathise with her feelings.
Similarly, Grace had been a strong character prior to her dementia and could still
use her determined nature to exercise some marital authority. Her husband Dennis
said she was never ‘one that likes to be told. If she feels that it’s right, ﬁne. But if
she has a gut feeling it’s wrong, she will argue’. Although Grace’s speech was
impaired, she could still indicate her preferences and dislikes, often non-verbally.
For example, as she was unable to identify in advance where she wanted to spend
the day, instead her husband discerned her wishes by taking her to a familiar place
and if this was not her preferred destination she would remark: ‘I didn’t want to
come here!’. Similarly, Dennis said Grace ate well in cafes but often did not eat the
meals he cooked: ‘when we go out … she’ll eat a lot but she just doesn’t seem to
want to eat at home’. Whilst Grace could not articulate that she disliked her hus-
band’s cooking, she could still convey where and whose food she liked to eat.
Setting goals or expressing values and aspirations?
Values and desires
Although goal-setting constitutes deliberative agency, imagining the future can also
involve ‘more ephemeral’ expressions such as hopes, fears and aspirations
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 984). Formulating goals may be challenging for peo-
ple with dementia, such as planning for the future when the illness may progress
(see Covinsky and Yaffe 2004). Although Gavin did not talk a lot (partly due to
impaired speech), some of his responses were quite expansive, emphatic and insight-
ful, indicating that he was more conscious of his environment and illness than ini-
tially appeared. At ﬁrst, it was unclear whether Gavin was aware of his dementia, as
he did not mention it or admit to having memory problems. When asked about his
health, he simply said it was ‘alright’. Nonetheless, it appeared that he had an impli-
cit awareness of his condition but was reluctant to acknowledge it. More speciﬁcally,
his wife had asked him about the illness: ‘I just said to him, I said, “– [husband’s
name], if you could have anything, what would you like?” [and] he said, “I’d like to
get better”. So he is aware’. Similarly, as the overall study showed that men were
more reluctant to acknowledge and ‘accept’ dementia than women, it appeared that
masculine values associated with being strong and healthy partly accounted for his
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efforts to distance himself from the illness (see also Verdonk, Seesing, and de Rijk
2010).
As Marion (who had dementia) often responded to the researchers with a brief
and generic ‘yeah’, this suggested that she did not understand what was meant or
could not ﬁnd the words to articulate her thoughts. However, at other times, she said
‘yes’ emphatically and repeatedly or spoke short phrases and also smiled or laughed,
indicating her comprehension and strength of feeling. Marion lacked the capacity to
make ﬁnancial decisions or handle money (e.g. she could not count or read or under-
stand bills) and she acknowledged that her husband always paid for their shopping
now: ‘well he … he does really, yeah’ (see Boyle 2013a). Yet her husband explained
that she had always been ﬁnancially independent and, accordingly, would still ask
him: ‘… she’ll say to me, “well, where is all my money?”’. Thus, she remained
aware of her ﬁnancial power and used this to exercise a degree of marital authority.
Therefore, whilst people with dementia may be unable to formulate and pursue
goals, they may still be able to identify their aspirations or use expressions of their
established values to inﬂuence the direction of their lives.
Deliberative agency and equality
The Mental Capacity Act (2005) in England and Wales emphasises the importance
of advance care planning to enable people with dementia to make decisions about
their future in accordance with their beliefs and values, and while they still have
capacity. However, the overall study showed that carer-spouses did not always
involve their partners with dementia in major decision-making processes (such as
whether to attend a day centre or designate ﬁnancial authority). Whilst this lack of
involvement seemed to be explained, in the main, by the presence of signiﬁcant
speech impairment that would have made decision-making more challenging, it was
not necessarily appropriate in terms of capacity, as the people with dementia often
retained the ability to make these decisions (Boyle 2013b). Indeed, the same Act
states that decisions should only be made on someone’s behalf when they lack the
capacity to make these decisions themselves. Accordingly, in some instances, it was
evident that the people with dementia did not have the capacity to make such deci-
sions themselves, although some could alternatively express their values or aspira-
tions. For example, although Mary lacked the capacity to make ﬁnancial decisions,
she could identify the low priority she gave to wealth, in contrast to the emphasis
she placed on her relationships: ‘You don’t need a lot of money, as long as you have
your happiness and one another and friends’. In other cases, however, people with
dementia were not given the opportunity to participate fully in decision-making
processes relating to their present and future care.
For example, obtaining a Lasting Power of Attorney enables carers to make deci-
sions on behalf of people with dementia (e.g. relating to welfare or ﬁnancial affairs).
However, although the Lasting Power of Attorney allows an authorised person to
make decisions even when the person with dementia retains the necessary capacity,
the latter must designate – when they still have capacity – the person to whom they
want to give such authority; otherwise an application to the Court of Protection may
be required (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007). Yet some spouse-carers
took over major decision-making without fully considering whether their spouses
had extant capacity to make such decisions, such that people with dementia experi-
enced unnecessary constraints on their agency. Consequently, it was not necessarily
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the dementia (or a lack of ‘rationality’) that prevented them from inﬂuencing their
lives. Instead, a lack of recognition or acknowledgement of their decision-making
capacity partly explained why carers constrained their agency. Similarly, people with
a learning disability may be marginalised in decision-making processes whereby
they are consulted but not permitted to make the ﬁnal decisions (Armstrong 2002).
Whilst determining capacity may have been challenging for carers of people with
dementia, at times their domination of the decision-making reﬂected a desire to
maintain control over major decisions, particularly when spouses (notably husbands)
had taken charge of such decision-making prior to the dementia (Boyle 2013b).
Therefore, whilst the agency of people with dementia is often facilitated by their ca-
rers, it may also be constrained by them.
Indeed, gender inequality inﬂuenced whether women with dementia were given
the opportunity to exercise deliberative agency in their everyday lives. Gendered
assumptions resulted in women with dementia being more likely to be deemed to
lack capacity, whereas men with dementia were more likely to have their capacity
facilitated by their wives, at least for minor decisions (see also Stefan 1993). More
speciﬁcally, wives who were carers were more likely to acknowledge and promote
their partners’ capacity than husband-carers.
Body language and emotion
People with dementia often use non-verbal communication to clarify their speech or
as alternative means of communication. Marion’s body language and mood were
quite negative when we met her initially – for example, she made little eye contact.
Correspondingly, her husband indicated that, whereas his wife had previously been
quite sociable, following the onset of her dementia she no longer enjoyed having
visitors. He said: ‘the strange thing about the illness is it’s caused us to not welcome
visitors, mmm, she doesn’t even welcome people who she befriended …’. Yet once
a rapport had been established, Marion became more at ease with our presence.
More speciﬁcally, she relaxed her body language, made good eye contact and often
smiled or laughed. Although she did not have the capacity to consent to the
research, she could articulate that she was happy to talk about her daily life – ‘yes,
that’s okay’. However, it was her embodied and emotional expressions which gave
the author conﬁdence that she was comfortable with being interviewed. Similarly,
whilst Marion appeared quite passive and ‘dependent’ at home, there were
discernible differences in her communication and behaviour when she was engaged
in a favourite outdoor activity. Although she needed assistance with activities of
daily living from her husband and also required conversational support during her
interview, Marion demonstrated initiative – verbally and hierarchically – when she
and her husband took their dog for a walk during the observation visit. Notably, she
guided the research assistant along their route by commenting and gesturing: ‘this
way’ or ‘straight ahead’. Accordingly, her discursive and embodied agency demon-
strated that she was not simply a passive care recipient but also someone who gave
care (see also Davies 2011). Indeed, conversing, observing and interacting with
Marion over time and in different social contexts enabled the researchers to develop
a more informed understanding of her capability for agency, beyond deliberative
agency.
It was not feasible to interview Emily because she had very limited speech and
lacked the ability to interact. Although the author had met Emily a few times prior
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to our one-to-one visit, she did not give any indication that she recognised me. Yet,
because she had a habit of walking constantly from the living room to the kitchen
but conﬁned herself to the former on this occasion, this suggested that she was com-
fortable with my presence. Apparent shifts in Emily’s mood were similarly conveyed
through her embodied and verbal communication. For example, she seemed cheerful
when she sang to herself ‘la la la’; alternatively, she appeared down or cross when
she made tearless cries or spoke negatively.
Despite Emily’s lack of dialogical ability, she nonetheless often appeared to
engage in conversation with one or more absent persons; that is, self-other dialogue
(Sullivan 2012). The content of her dialogue suggested that she viewed herself rela-
tionally, particularly as she engaged in a key feminine role (as a daughter) and
recognised other people’s social roles, albeit her sense of self was somewhat out-
dated (see Caddell and Clare 2010). For example, she mentioned ‘mam’ twice as if
she was talking to her own mother and also referred to a man at work: ‘… he goes
to work and he comes, comes down …’. In addition, she related to others in her dia-
logue according to accepted conventions; for example, by providing afﬁrmations or
reassurance: ‘yeah, I know, I know love [inaudible]. Are you sure? …’. She also
took the lead at times, by giving instructions: ‘… what you, what you got? Have
you got it? Yeah’. Moreover, she made social judgements, evident when she consid-
ered whether to reproach a man for a perceived injury: ‘… I could tell him off so,
so’. As Emirbayer and Mische (1998) pointed out, imagination is an important con-
duit for envisaging social change, or at least social action.
Although Emily’s internalised social reality may have substituted for a lack of
ability to socially interact, nonetheless there were also instances when she engaged
socio-emotionally. For example, during the observation visit, Emily’s husband (Ken)
guided her to sit beside him using a playful dynamic whereby he counted ‘one, two,
three’ and she responded with a sound like a cheer. In addition, during the ‘interac-
tion’ with the author, whereas Emily initially walked around the perimeter of the
room, she later altered her route to walk diagonally through the centre whereby she
had to pass directly by me. As she halted, made eye contact and smiled or laughed
on each occasion, she evidenced curiosity and an interest in social relations. She
also took a playful lead in the interaction at one point (she approached from behind,
whereupon I jumped and she then laughed), suggesting some relational ability.
A social world, a social self
Whereas Giddens (1991) conceptualised reﬂexivity as an individualised, rational
process, Burkitt (2012) suggested that it is relational, dialogical and emotionally dri-
ven. Joseph said his wife (Marion) did not accept her dementia. Correspondingly,
when it was initially explained to her that the research involved talking to people
with memory loss, she said she did not have a problem. This lack of acceptance or
acknowledgement of dementia has been viewed as pathological (for example,
Zanetti et al. 1999), indicative of an apparent lack of reﬂective ability. In contrast,
however, such individuals can demonstrate that they do reﬂect on their illness and
its possible implications. For example, Joseph said that Marion had recently got
upset, revealing that she felt she was losing her mind and was afraid she was going
to be taken away, which indicated that she had some awareness of her illness. He
explained:
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… she said something like ‘I think I’m losing it’ and she was crying … and she’s real-
ising that she’s not, mmm, you know fait accompli with everything … Last week she
said, ‘I think they’re coming to take me away’, mmm …
Although Marion’s ability to participate in social relationships was reduced, as
she revealed subtle relational abilities and an awareness of marital conventions, she
nonetheless manifested a social self. For example, when asked who usually bought
her clothes, she was quite clear that her husband did and also explained that he gave
his opinion on what suited her, reﬂecting a gendered norm: ‘cos he says “oh, oh I
don’t like that one”, you know, so …’. She also evidenced an awareness that she
needed help with dressing – that is, ongoing support: ‘… he’d have a look at it to
see if it’s, er … you know, the, the right thing … Yeah, so that I don’t get, erm, the
wrong sort of thing, you know?’ Despite the limitations imposed by her dementia
and by gender norms, Marion still exercised some control over what she wore, as her
husband said she did not wear the clothes he bought if she disliked them. Thus,
Marion could exercise agency, including capacities for reﬂection and even reﬂexivity.
During the ‘interaction’ with Emily, her tone was initially a little negative, sug-
gesting she was in a bad mood and was annoyed with another person. She said: ‘…
I can’t be bothered …’ and went on to say: ‘he’s done it, yeah’. As this was quickly
followed by a comment: ‘… he will won’t he?, he come back …’, she may have
been aware that I was a relative stranger and therefore concerned that her husband
had left her (even temporarily). She considered the possibility of reproaching some-
one, possibly her husband: ‘I could tell him off so, so … this morning, when he
comes home though … I’ve got to say, say something …’ (utterances omitted).
Despite her apparent lack of social awareness, Emily may have been conscious that
she was dependent on others, as she implied that she could not go out alone: ‘… I
can’t, can’t get out there’. Paradoxically, her comment ‘… you’ve got to get your
own life …’ may have been an acknowledgement of her loss of independence and,
subconsciously, an awareness of her ill-health.
Emily did not speak directly to the author in our ‘interaction’, except via limited
utterances. Nonetheless, her dialogue was multi-voiced, such that she directed her
commentary at others and addressed their perceived responses (see Sullivan 2012).
For example, she appeared to advise another person that she should pose a request
to a man they both knew: ‘no, you have to, have ask him … Yeah. No, no, no, no.
Yeah, I know, I know love … Are you sure? …’ As Emily’s ability to learn about
or change her social world was very limited, she lacked the ability for complex
reﬂexivity. Nonetheless, her communication – whether linguistic or embodied – was
relational, dialogical and emotionally prompted (by love, joy, anger and anxiety).
Accordingly, her nuanced communication revealed a degree of ‘reﬂective conscious-
ness’ (Sullivan 2012, 178) and even a capacity for basic reﬂexivity.
Conclusions
Less talk, more communication
People with dementia demonstrated deliberative agency when they made decisions.
Yet, because agency theory privileges language (Madhok 2013), and even conﬂates
language and rationality, people with dementia who lack speech are then assumed to
lack rationality. As a result, those who retain decisional capacity, but lack discursive
abilities, are denied opportunities for exercising deliberative agency. Similarly,
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professional discourse and interaction with people with learning difﬁculties often
construct them as incompetent, particularly when disabling (rather than enabling)
communication methods are used (Goodley and Rapley 2002). At the same time, an
over-rationalised concept of agency disregards more pragmatic and creative forms of
agency (see also Duncan 2011). Indeed, people with advanced dementia sometimes
expressed their perceptions, feelings and desires in habituated, embodied or emo-
tional forms. Such expressions often demonstrated continuity in their personal and
social identities – for example, a feminine or masculine self, or marital and caring
roles. Thus, even when their capabilities for language, deliberation and social (inter)
action are extremely limited, people with dementia may still demonstrate imagina-
tive agency (see Emirbayer and Mische 1998).
Acting and reﬂecting
Since conceptualising and undertaking action are often challenging for people with
dementia, a ‘strongly purposive’ concept of agency is less relevant (Emirbayer and
Mische 1998, 984). Nonetheless, the study showed that adequate provision of sup-
port can enable people with dementia to participate more fully in family life. Allardt
(1993) referred to ‘having, loving and being’ as encapsulating the necessary condi-
tions for human development, where ‘being’ relates to a person’s needs for meaning-
ful involvement in society. Accordingly, as people with dementia ﬁnd ‘doing’ more
of a challenge than ‘being’ (or loving), their expressions of agency may be less dis-
tinctive from their identity, such that the latter may be a key means through which
they seek to shape their social worlds.
Advance decision-making and care planning enabled people with dementia to
make decisions about their future while they still retained decisional capacity. Alter-
natively, for some people with advanced dementia, basic expressions of their values
or aspirations enabled them to have a say in their lives and project their hopes for
the future (see Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Thus, whereas agency is theorised as
highly reﬂexive or, alternatively, habituated and non-reﬂexive (Giddens 1991;
Duncan 2011), some people with dementia may instead demonstrate imaginative
projection (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).
Self-reﬂection is ‘the ordinary, everyday ways people reﬂect on themselves and
their actions’, whereas reﬂexivity involves using knowledge about the social world
to change social practices (Burkitt 2012, 459). It was evident that people with
advanced dementia could demonstrate self-reﬂection – for example, in terms of
acknowledging their illness, adhering to social conventions and negotiating marital
dynamics. In addition, when reﬂexivity is deﬁned as relational, dialogical and emo-
tionally motivated (Burkitt 2012) – that is, as a socio-emotional rather than a cogni-
tive process – then people with advanced dementia could be seen to be somewhat
reﬂexive. Indeed, they used their emotions to form judgements about their interper-
sonal situations and to respond relationally. Therefore, it is suggested that they can
exercise basic agency and even a social self (Burkitt 2008).
Agency and equality
However, whether people with dementia have a say in their current lives and can
inﬂuence the direction of their future lives is often constrained by under-recognition
of their agency, limitations in support, conﬂicts of needs and interests between them
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and their carers, a lack of formal social care and wider social inequalities (see also
Oliver and Barnes 2012). Whereas the dominant, cognitive model of dementia nar-
rowly views (primarily negative) emotions and behaviour as symptomatic of the ill-
ness (Finkel 2000), in contrast a social model of dementia is needed which
acknowledges that behaviour and emotion may be indicative of agency. Since people
with dementia need practical support, they are dependent on others to enable their
social participation. Thus, a concept of ‘assisted autonomy’ is relevant in dementia;
that is, where support is required to enable the exercise of agency (see also Morris
2005). More generally, since agency is located within, and derived from, interdepen-
dent relations, it always requires the support of others (whether or not we have
dementia). Similarly, whilst debate about caring for older people has traditionally
focused on their ‘dependency’, Tronto emphasised the need to recognise our interde-
pendency as ‘throughout our lives, all of us go through varying degrees of depen-
dence and interdependence’ (1993, 135). However, whilst the relational basis of
agency is portrayed as egalitarian, on the contrary, social resources are often
unequally distributed (see also Duncan 2011). Indeed, some people with dementia
lacked opportunities for exercising agency when their spouses did not acknowledge
or facilitate their capacity for agency. Likewise, the support given to people with
learning difﬁculties can either emancipate or oppress them (Goodley 2000). Of
course, the limited provision of formal social care adds to the challenges carers
experience when trying to support people with dementia (see National Audit Ofﬁce
2007; Department of Health 2009).
In order for people with dementia to achieve equality, their potential agency
needs to be recognised and facilitated. Fundamentally, a more expansive concept of
agency is needed in social science theory that is informed by the experiences of cog-
nitively disabled people. Such a concept would adopt a broader conception of capa-
bility (see Burchardt 2004), take account of communication other than language,
recognise emotional forms of social ‘action’ and allow for imaginative agency even
when the potential for social change is limited. Importantly, acknowledging the
socio-emotional, rather than cognitive, basis of reﬂexivity would enable the agency
of people with advanced dementia to be more readily recognised (see Burkitt 2012).
However, as the study did not include people with severe dementia, further research
is needed into whether they can also exercise agency. In addition, as research meth-
ods commonly used in advanced dementia are unable to recognise, or even disre-
gard, agency (such as dementia care mapping; Brooker and Surr 2006), future
research should prioritise the use of methods that engage directly with the individ-
ual’s intersubjectivity (socio-emotionally and ethically) and are sensitive to her/his
agency.
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